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Abstract Throughout the literature on personal identity, the term ‘four-
dimensionalism’ is poorly understood. Indeed, Mark Johnston deploys the concept
of ontological trash to show that there is no feasible four-dimensionalist account
of a person as an object entirely within spacetime, but he does not consider
how any particular theory of spacetime or four-dimensionalism comes to bear
on personhood. In this paper I will explain this line of reasoning, clarify four-
dimensionalism, and show that there is a feasible account of personhood available
on four-dimensionalism. In the introduction, I explain the concept of ontological
trash and its threat to personhood. In the οrst section, I explain the concept of time
dilation and use it, in conjunction with ontological trash, to prove that a person’s
life does not have an unqualiοed temporal duration. In the second section, I sum-
marise Cody Gilmore’s analysis of four-dimensionalism and explain how it comes to
bear on persistence. In the third section, I sketch a new way to escape ontological
trash in light of four-dimensionalism. In the fourth section, I apply this response to
personhood, arguing that persons exist fully within spacetime and can withstand
almost any psychological change. In the conclusion, I reπect on avenues for future
research.
1 Persons and personites as ontological trash
Time is Ěeeting. Perhaps the most salient feature of a person’s life is how liĴle time
they have to live. Indeed, the recognition of time’s seemingly unjust imposition upon
life helps motivate Mark Johnston’s argument that it is rational to hope that this life,
*James Brown-Kinsella graduated from Princeton University in 2019, majoring in Philosophy and
minoring in Humanistic Studies, French Language and Culture, and East Asian Studies. Next year, he
will pursue an MPhil in China studies on a fellowship at the Yenching Academy of Peking University.
James is interested in studying ancient Chinese thinkers in the way that ancient Greek thinkers have
been studied.
16 Aporia VЂϿ. 19 NЂ. 1
conęned to spacetime, is not all there is to one’s existence.1 His argument rests on the
idea of ontological trash―i.e. a heap of nearly identical objects, all with equal claim
to ontological priority. If we are ontological trash, so Johnston argues, then practical
reason can be of no use to us. But practical reason is useful, so we ought to reject
any account of personhood on which we are ontologically trashy, notably any four-
dimensionalist account. In this introduction I will summarise Johnston’s argument
and motivate a closer look at four-dimensionalism. First, I will explain the concept of
ontological trash, as well as the ontologically trashy version of a person: a personite.
Finally, I will show howpersonites pose a threat to practical reason, andwhy this leads
us to re-examine what it means for a theory of personhood to be four-dimensionalist.
A thing is ontological trash if in its nearest spatiotemporal vicinity there are many
other things that are nearly identical to it, ontologically on par with it, and which all
diěer from it only in conditions of persistence.2 Consider a ęst as it exists through time.
A ęst comes into being when you clench your ęngers all the way, and it ceases to exist
when you unclench your ęngers. On this way of looking at a ęst, whenever you have
a ęst, you will also have a strew of other ęst-like objects. There will be loads that are
composed of the ęst plus the ęngers during the moments before they were clenched;
there will be loads that are composed of the ęst plus the ęngers during the moments
after they were unclenched; and there will be loads that are composed of the ęst plus
the ęngers during the moments both before and after they were clenched. All of these
objects are nearly identical to your ęst; they are composed of the same stuě as your
ęst; and they diěer from your ęst only in their conditions of persistence. When you
look at your ęst it is therefore impossible to distinguish it from any of the other ęst-like
objects in its ontological trash heap.3
When it comes to persons, the ontological trash heap is piled high with personites.
A personite coincides with a person and may share one but not two temporal end-
points with a person.4 It could come into existence and cease to be somewhere within
its person’s lifetime; it could come into existence at a time later than its person’s origin
and cease to be when its person ceases to be; or vice versa. Because a personite is made
up of exactly the same stuě as its person and because it diěers from its person only in
the sort of changes it can survive, a personite is very person-like. If persons just are
sums of instantaneous person-stages over time, then there is one personite for every
interval of time within a person’s lifetime (i.e. inęnitely many). If persons are instead
chains of physically or psychologically continuous person-stages, then any parameter
of the continuity relation (e.g. the degree of connectedness necessary for continuity or
whether the chain is maximal or not) could be tweaked to produce hoards of person-
1. Mark Johnston, ‘Is Hope For Another Life Rational?’ (Unpublished, 2017), 4.
2. Ibid., 7.
3. Ibid.
4. Mark Johnston, ‘The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?’,Noûs 50, no. 4 (2016):
199.
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ites.5 The worry that Johnston elaborates is that any four-dimensionalist account of a
person will take one of these two forms and thus will be unable to separate the person
from the legion of personites with equal ontological status.6
Ontological trash is mostly nontoxic. For objects like ęsts ontological trash only
gets in the way of our analysis. When you throw a punch the host of ęst-like objects
that swing with your ęrst do not help you hit any harder. Practically speaking, there
will be only one impact and it does not maĴer that amultitude of objects were respons-
ible for it. However, objects like persons get a special moral status in virtue of being
the kind of object that they are. We ought, ceteris paribus, to avoid causing persons un-
due or uncompensated harm; to respect the intentions and future interests of ourselves
and other persons; and to act according to many other uncontroversial moral imper-
atives. We ought to act this way toward persons just in virtue of a certain property or
properties of personhood. Anything that possesses the same properties should be re-
spected in the same way. An ontologically trashy theory of personhood thus corrupts
our moral framework because personites are too person-like for their interests to be
neglected. Taking personites into our moral calculus leads to at least ten destructive
consequences.7 I will highlight one of them. A trip to the gym would torture the per-
sonites who exist entirely during the pain of physical exertion andwho cannot be com-
pensated after they have ceased to exist. Similarly, learning a language or undertaking
any sort of long-term investment that involves short-term pain, frustration, or other
harm will oppress some personites without compensation.8 So it seems impossible to
promote our own interests without being morally Ěagrant. Personites, as ontological
trash, inevitably pollute our moral thinking.
We are, in fact, practical and rational creatures. From this strong intuition Johnston
invokes ‘a kind of pragmatic a priori:’9 that practical reason requires us to be able to
make decisions about how to act, for otherwise wewould be paralysed in deliberation.
More specięcally, in order to take any deliberate action, we are required to believe that
we can avoid doing bad; that we can achieve some sort of good; and that we can use
some form of ethics to guide our behaviour. But as we saw above, personites pollute
our moral thinking, so practical reason demands that we reject any theory of person-
hood that yields personites. Because any four-dimensionalist account of personhood
would yield personites, we are practically required not to believe it. Thus we can hold
out hope that our existence is more than just our career in spacetime.
But what exactly does four-dimensionalism entail? Based on Johnston’s use of the
term, an object that exists four-dimensionally is one whose ‘whole reality. . . is found
within its spatiotemporal envelope.’10 CodyGilmore however has dedicated a paper to
5. Johnston, ‘Is Hope...’, 7.
6. Johnston, passim, especially ‘The Personite Problem’.
7. Johnston, ‘The Personite Problem’, 10.
8. Ibid., 17–18.
9. Johnston, ‘Is Hope...’, 7.
10. Ibid., 6.
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disambiguating all the theories that go by this name, and spelling out which are sup-
ported by the relativity theory of spacetime.11 With such confusion, one can hold out
hope that there is still an account of persistence that is four-dimensionalist in the sense
that it explains the reality of an object while keeping it fully in spacetime and without
throwing it in ontological trash heaps. In the following sections, I will ęrst explore the
concept of persistence through time by highlighting how the relativity theory of space-
time reveals more ontological trash, then I will disambiguate four-dimensionalist the-
ories of persistence and sketch a four-dimensionalist strategy for avoiding ontological
trash altogether. After investigating persistence, I will return to personal identity to
propose a deęnition of a person that keeps us fully in spacetime.
2 Relativity and a problem for persistence
Before diving into ontological trash, it is important to remember that physics should
always bear on metaphysics. Since the current trend in physics is that we are living in
a relativistic spacetime, any account of persistence through time should be expressed
in a relativistic account of time. However, the relativity theory of spacetime is a very
complicated ęeld of study in itself; I can only hope to scratch the surface here. Never-
theless, in this section I will ęrst lay out the basics of the relativity theory of spacetime,
and then oěer a new, relativity-based variant of ontological trash that reveals hoards
of objects lurking on any account of persistence wholly in spacetime.
On the relativistic view of spacetime, neither time nor space are held as absolute
constants. Instead, it is the speed of light that is invariable. Light, when measured
by any observer, will move through a certain medium with a certain speed in meters
per second. Accordingly, space and time give way in order to accommodate this fact.
Imagine you have a very odd clock that consists of a laser gun, a thin pole of a known
length, a mirror at the end of that pole, and a receptor aĴached to the laser. You press
a buĴon and the laser ęres a beam of light, which travels the known distance to the
mirror, where it bounces back and travels to the receptor to be absorbed. Since the
speed of light is constant, since you know the length of the pole, and since speed is just
distance over time, you can infer the amount of time, in seconds, that passed during the
laser beam’s journey. Whenever you ęre the laser, you can trust that it will accurately
measure how time passes for you.
Now suppose you have a friend who measures your clock while you move very
quickly. Perhaps you are standing on the caboose of a train moving at a known speed
along a set of straight tracks and your friend watches from the train station with bin-
oculars as you ęre the laser at a right angle to the train’s path. From your friend’s
perspective, the distance of the laser beam’s path is slightly longer than it is from your
11. Cody Gilmore, Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi, ‘Relativity and Three FourDimensionalisms’,
Philosophy Compass 11, no. 2 (2016): 102.
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perspective. From your friend’s perspective, it has to travel not only the length of the
pole, but also the distance the train has traveled before its journey can come to an end.
But light moves at the same speed for both you and your friend, so when your friend
uses the speed of light to infer the time it took for the laser beam to complete its journey,
because the distance hemeasured is greater than the length of the pole, hewill infer that
more time, in seconds, has passed during the beam’s journey from his perspective than
would have passed from your perspective.12
This example rings like a paradox, but it will make more sense given the notion
of a reference frame. A reference frame is a collection of objects that are all at rest
with respect to each other. In the context of a certain reference frame, the classical
intuitions about time and distance enter back into the relativistic view of spacetime.13
In your friend’s reference frame, the train moves quickly away from the station, while
in your reference frame it is the tracks that move quickly underneath the train. Neither
perspective can describe the example beĴer than the other, but because the speed of
lightmust remain constant, we are forced by the relativity theory of spacetime to accept
that time passes diěerently in diěerent reference frames. Thus, the amount of time
through which any object persists will be relative to the reference frame in which it is
viewed.
If all there is to existence is spacetime, then this last fact―that temporal duration
is relative to reference frame―should oěer hope for even more ontological trash. The
looming threat of ontological trash should hold generally for all objects that persist
four-dimensionally in the sense that their whole reality is within spacetime, but I will
use the example of a person to Ěesh it out. First, suppose that every life has a tem-
poral length: the amount of time that passes from a person’s birth to their death. Now
suppose something even less controversial:
(Leibniz’s Law) ‘Objects x and y are numerically identical only if they have exactly
the same properties.’14
entailing that two persons can be identical only if they have the same temporal length.
Suppose that a person, Fred, lives for 80 years. Any person that is identical to Fred
must also live for 80 years. In Fred’s own reference frame, hiswatchwill tick at a steady
rate, and when it reaches 80 years he will expire, having had no trouble discerning
whether he was one and the same person over the course of his life. But if a friend of
his ever escorted him to a train station and waved to him as he sped away, the person
12. George F.R. Ellis and Ruth M. Williams, Flat and Curved Space-times, 2nd ed. (Oxford University
Press, 2000), 28–29.
13. Cody Gilmore, ‘Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime’, Philosophy Compass 3, no. 6
(2008): 1226.
14. Theodore Sider, ‘Temporal Parts’, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, ed. Theodore Sider, John
Hawthorne and Dean W. Zimmerman (Blackwell, 2007), 4.
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the friendwould havewaved to, call him Fred*, couldn’t be Fred. For as we saw above,
Fred*will exist for slightlymore time, asmeasured in the friend’s reference frame, than
Fred will whenmeasured in his own reference frame. But then they wouldn’t have the
same temporal length, and by Leibniz’s Law, Fred* couldn’t be the same person as
Fred.
To be clear, Fred* is not Fred, but he is deęnitely very Fred-like; he is made of
the same stuě as Fred; and he diěers from Fred only in conditions of persistence. In
order to show that there is ontological trash lurking, all that remains to be shown is
that there are many more things like Fred*. To seek them out, consider that Fred*, too,
has a temporal length associated with his life: 80 + x years, where x is a positive real
number. Now consider the host of beings, Fredn, that are exactly like Fred except that
their lives at most 80 + nx years long, where n ranges through the natural numbers.
These beings are not persons, since their lives do not have deęnite temporal lengths,
but they are still very Fred-like (Fred1 is identical to Fred*, and Fred0 just is Fred!), they
are made up of the same stuě as Fred, and they diěer from Fred only in conditions of
persistence. As n increases, each Fredn will be able to survive the change to frames
of reference that put him in motion for more and more time. In Fred’s own reference
frame, all of the Fredn coincide on him.
What could there be to make Fred ontologically superior to any of the Fredn?
Without an answer to that question, it would seem like the relativity theory of space-
time turns Fred and all other objects whose existence is fully exhausted by spacetime
into ontological trash. A simple change of reference frame is enough to change the
properties of an object and introduce a hoard of ontological trash. But how could a
change of reference frame, that is a change in the way one observes an object, actu-
ally change that object? Indeed, Johnston aĜrms this confusion when he sketches the
concept of ontological trash in his paper ‘On Being Ontological Trash.’ He writes that
it is not as if ‘our more specięc ways of looking at or conceiving of things thereby bring
other things into being. Rather ... [they] select from among things that are already there.
[italics in original]’15 Change of reference frame should not change an object, so there
should be no question as to whether the Fredn are identical to Fred. These beings
seemed diěerent only because they each had a diěerent unqualięed temporal dura-
tion. So instead of highlighting a new layer of ontological trash that envelops ordinary
objects, Fred and the Fredn actually serve as a reductio ad absurdum to the conclusion
that unqualięed temporal length is not a property. Therefore, an account of persist-
ence that keeps objects fully in spacetime is possible in a relativistic spacetime, so long
as temporal duration is always relative to a reference frame. For the remainder of this
paper, whenever I give an unqualięed time or temporal duration associated with an
object, it should be interpreted as time relative to the reference frame where that object is at
rest.
15. Mark Johnston, ‘On Being Ontological Trash’ (unpublished, 2017), 8.
Ontological Dumpster Diving 21
3 The landscape of persistence
What other constraints might relativity place on an account of persistence that is four-
dimensional in the sense that it keeps objects fully in spacetime? In ‘Relativity and
Three Four-Dimensionalisms,’ Cody Gilmore explains how relativity comes to bear on
two diěerent four-dimesnionalist views:16 mereological perdurantism and locational
perdurantism.17 In this section I will explainwhat these two perdurantisms entail, why
a relativistic spacetime points strongly toward the truth of locational perdurantism,
and argue that locational perdurance is four-dimensionalist in the sense relevant to a
four-dimensionalist account of persons.
It will be easier to understand perdurantism by contrasting it with its negation,
endurantism. First, there is the domain of mereology, which is the study of a how a
whole is composed of its parts. Mereological perdurantism is the view that all complex
objects are composed of temporal parts. An object mereologically perdures if and only
if it is a series of achronal chunks, or object-stages, that succeed each other over time.
Mereological endurantism, however, holds that objects do not have temporal parts. In-
stead, an object mereologically endures if and only if it is wholly present whenever it
exists.18 The heart of this side of the debate between perdurantism and endurantism is
about which is more fundamental: an object’s presence at each time it is present or its
presence throughout its lifetime. A mereological perdurantist thinks an object’s tem-
poral parts explain its entirety, whereas a mereological endurantist thinks an object’s
entirety explains its presence at each time it is present.
Second, there is the domain of location, which concerns the precise region where
an object is found. Locational perdurance is the view that material objects occupy only
their whole spacetime path. So an object locationally perdures if and only if the single
place it is located is the four-dimensional region that is its whole career, swept out
through spacetime. Locational endurance, on the other hand, is the view that material
objects occupy many diěerent regions: the manifold achronal chunks of their path. So
an object locationally endures if and only if it occupies many regions and each region
it occupies is a three-dimensional slice of its path at a time. The crux of this side of
the debate is over which sort of region is more fundamental for an object: its four-
dimensional whole or its three-dimensional manifestations at times. The locational
perdurantist believes that the four-dimensional region of an object’s course through
spacetime explains the smaller three-dimensional regions that that object has at diěer-
ent times, whereas the locational endurantist holds that an object’s three-dimensional
shape at the times when it is present explains the four-dimensional region it sweeps
16. Gilmore, Costa and Calosi, ‘Relativity...’, 102.
17. Gilmore, ‘Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime’, 1227.
18. Katherine Hawley, ‘Temporal Parts’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2018 edition,
ed. Edward N. Zalta (2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/temporal-
parts/.
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The issues of these two debates are quite similar, but they remain nevertheless in-
dependent. Likewise, relativity does not support both views in the sameway. Gilmore
presents detailed versions of the arguments from relativity theory to both forms of per-
durantism in sections of ‘Relativity and Three Four-Dimensionalisms’20 and in ‘Persist-
ence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime,’21 but they require toomuch knowledge of
spacetime geometry to present here. Instead, I will take his conclusions that it is very
likely that space and time are not fundamentally separate entities,22 and that this im-
plies locational perdurantism.23 Therefore, a locationally perdurantist account of per-
sistence will be consistent with a relativistic spacetime.
Such a view also implies that the reality of an object might be wholly exhausted by
its spatiotemporal extent. For what is there to push an object outside of its spacetime
envelope if the region it occupies just is its spacetime envelope? An object could ex-
ist partially outside of spacetime and could locationally perdure in the sense that the
region in spacetime that it occupies is its four-dimensional career through spacetime
even though this region is not all there is to the object. But this is just one Ěavor of the
view. Locational perdurantism is also consistent with both mereological perdurant-
ism and endurantism. Relativity thus leaves two options on the table for an account of
perdurance that keeps objects fully in spacetime.
4 Taking out the trash
Now that it is clear that there is wiggle roomwithin relativity for an account of persist-
ence that is four-dimensionalist in the relevant sense, the next task is to see whether
such an account can also avoid ontological trash. When Johnston sketches out the
concept of ontological trash, he considers two possible accounts of persistence through
time, both of which are consistent with locational perdurantism. The ęrst is a type of
mereological endurantism, in that ‘at each time [there are] a plenitude of co-extensive
objects, each with a diěerent condition of survival, some of which get teased out by
this or that change.’ The second is mereological perdurantism, where ‘sequences or
parades or cross-time sums of short-lived objects, temporal stages of [things]’ com-
pose complex objects.24 In this section, I will present Johnston’s arguments to ontolo-
gical trash from mereological perdurance and from a common form of mereological
19. Cody Gilmore, ‘Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime’, in Mereology and the Sciences: Parts
and Wholes in the Contemporary Scientięc Context, ed. Claudio Calosi and Pierluigi Graziani (Springer,
2014), 9.
20. Gilmore, Costa and Calosi, ‘Relativity...’, 11–14.
21. Gilmore, ‘Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime’, 1299–35.
22. Gilmore, Costa and Calosi, ‘Relativity...’, 4.
23. Gilmore, ‘Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime’, 1235.
24. Johnston, ‘On Being...’, 8.
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endurance, and then show that amid the mereologically enduring ontological trash,
there is always one object that can claim ontological supremacy.
Mereological perdurance straightforwardly entails that objects are ontological
trash. First, consider a ęst as a mereological perdurantist would see it. A ęst only
exists because a collection of a short-lived ęst-stages succeed each other for a given
interval of time. So whenever you have a ęst, you will also have objects that are com-
posed of all of the ęst’s temporal parts plus some temporal parts of the hand from
right before it was clenched, from right after it was unclenched, or from both times.
You will also have many objects that are composed of all of the ęst’s temporal parts
except a couple from right after it was clenched, from right before it was unclenched,
or from both. All of these objects are nearly identical with a ęst; they are composed
of the same stuě as a ęst; and diěer from a ęst only in their conditions of persistence.
Because they all overlap on your fully clenched ęst, why are we to suppose we are
looking at the maximal ęst and not at any of its doppelgängers? Thus, persistence on
mereological perdurantism is hopelessly ontologically trashy.25
The path to ontological trash from mereological endurantistism is a bit less obvi-
ous. Suppose that ęsts cannot be reduced to temporal parts. Instead, a ęst is a hand
that is clenched all the way and it survives until the hand is unclenched to a lesser a
degree. However, if this account correctly describes an object, then there is also the
half-ęst: a hand clenched half of the way that survives until it is either clenched more
or unclenched, as well as the quarter-ęst and eighth-ęst and so on for every fraction
of a ęst. And there is nothing to rule out the deęnition of the at-least-half ęst, which
is identical to the half-ęst but which can survive further clenching, and the at-least-
quarter ęst and so on for every fractional ęst. So whenever you have a ęst, you have a
host of at-least ęsts which are all very ęst-like; they are all made up of the same stuě:
a hand with ęngers rolled to a degree or range of degrees; and they diěer only in con-
ditions of persistence. Thus, even on a mereologically enduring view of persistence,
there is ontological trash.
We should not hold out hope for ęnding a non-ontologically-trashy deęnition of
a ęst, but we can acknowledge that buried at the boĴom of the trash heap there is an
object upon which all the others are ontologically derivative: the hand. Why must we
demand that the ęst exist in its own right? It’s not as if the hand disappears when we
look at the ęst. Rather, the ęst seems like a phase of the hand’s existence. In general:
If an object x is deęned by possessing a property F continuously through
time to degree d, where d could range through a plurality of values, the
non-ontologically-trashy substitute for xwill have F continuously through
time to any degree at all.
This account will not render objects exactly as we expect them to be. Wemust wave
25. Johnston, ‘Is Hope...’, 7.
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goodbye to the idea of ęsts as ontologically basic. But only on this account can any
object in the vicinity of the ęst fully exist in spacetime and emerge from the ontological
trash heap.
5 Salvaging the four-dimensional account of persons
With a four-dimensionalist account of persistence that avoids ontological trash, the
path is clear to rescue the four-dimensionalist view of a person. In this section I will
present such a view by adapting Derek Paręt’s reductionist account of personhood26
to the schema I introduced above, and then I will explain why this counterintuitive
solution should make sense.
First, a word about Paręt’s account. It is reductionist in the sense that it holds that
all there is to personhood is the holding of other, more specięc facts concerning psy-
chological continuity and bodily continuity. Johnston adapts Paręt’s view so that only
psychological continuity is relevant to personhood and presents it as such:
A person x, considered at t1, is numerically one and the same person as a
person y, considered at t2, if and only if the mental proęle (the congeries of
mental states and events) exhibited by x at t1 is Do psychologically continu-
ous with the mental proęle exhibited by y at t2; (where Do is construed as
the [relevant] degree of psychological connectedness. . .)27
Johnston demonstrates that, on this account, although persons mereologically en-
dure,28 there are still personites in the form of continuity variants that are psycholo-
gically continuous to more restrictive or less restrictive degrees. Thus, on the psycho-
logical variant of Paręt’s account we are ontological trash. Johnston acknowledges,
however, that a ‘continuity variant that places the least demands on connectedness, if
there is such a one’ would be the only way out of this case of personites. That way, ‘all
the other continuity variants. . . might be able to be construed as phases on such least
demanding wholes.’29
My proposal is that a person just is that least demanding continuity variant. Put
more precisely:
A person x, considered at t1, is numerically one and the same person as a
person y, considered at t2, if and only if the mental proęle (the congeries of
26. Derek Paręt, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press, 1984), 207, quoted in Mark Johnston,
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mental states and events) exhibited by x at t1 is psychologically continuous
to any degree at all with the mental proęle exhibited by y at t2.
Questions of survival in the classic cases of amnesia, teletransportation, fusion, and
ęssion, as well as the possibility of a resurrection, should all be treated similarly under
this view as theywere under the psychological variant of Paręt’s original view.30 Paręt
would not endorse my view, since he held that ‘[i]f there was only a single [direct
psychological] connection, x [today] and y [yesterday] would not be on the revised
Lockean view the same person,’31 and this minimal psychological connection just is
the criterion of identity on my account. However, if spacetime is all there is, then
my account is a non-trashy, ontologically superior alternative to Paręt’s account and
Johnston’s continuity variants.
Psychological connectedness, and therefore its ancestral relation continuity, does
admit of degrees, but that is no reason to think that a stronger degree of connectedness
enables some psychologically persisting entities to survive where other, more weakly
continuous entities would cease to be. To get a sense for why this is so, imagine two
persons, Joan and Joni. Suppose that there is a trace amount of psychological continuity
between Joan considered at t1 and Joni considered at t2, but not enough for Joan and
Joni to be numerically one and the same. Perhaps this is a very severe case of partial
amnesia. Joan’s friends and family would certainly think that Joni is a ghost of the per-
son they knew, and they would likely mourn the absence of Joan. But would Joni, a
newly minted person, have to apply for citizenship? Should Joan’s next of kin execute
the ęnal will and testament of their late beloved? And if Joni aĴempted to learn Joan’s
tendencies and to embrace Joan’s personality, would she be at best an imposter for the
real Joan who disappeared long ago? This borderline case should show that although
our feelings about personhood respond to a minimum threshold of psychological con-
tinuity, falling below that threshold should not actually constitute death. Some very
person-like thing does survive such a drastic change. What could it be other than that
very person?
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown through a reductio ad absurdum that, in a relativistic space-
time, unqualięed temporal duration is not a property; identięed a version of persist-
ence that is permissible in a relativistic spacetime and is properly four-dimensionalist
in the sense it keeps objects fully in spacetime; given a four-dimensionalist account of
persistence that avoids ontological trash; and ęnally, defended a deęnition of a person
that persists in such a manner.
30. This view could even be supplemented with an additional clause about some sort of bodily con-
tinuity if evidence is found to suggest that bodily continuity should also maĴer in survival.
31. Paręt, Reasons and Persons, 207, quoted in Johnston, ‘Is Hope...’, 8
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With such a resilient interpretation of what it is to be a person, we can coherently
think of ourselves as objects whose existence is fully captured by our spacetime envel-
opes. We are surrounded by ontological trash (e.g. our ęsts) but we are not, ourselves,
ontological trash. Thus, we can rescue practical reason from the personite problem
without believing that part of us must be outside of spacetime. But in order to lift
ourselves above the personites, we must admit that the single person seems to survive
too much. All it takes to survive is a chain of continuity made of the weakest possible
links of psychological connectedness. Assuming that Shoemaker’s theory of psycho-
logical connectedness as causal dependence is the most tenable account, a robust the-
ory of personal identity will explore the weakest sort of a causal dependence that still
counts as psychological connected.32 For instance, do mental states only transitively
causally linked still count as psychologically connected? Consider a person’s mental
state at t1whenwriting something down and theirmental state at t2when readingwhat
they wrote. These mental states are ordinarily connected, e.g. in the case of a to-do list.
Are they still connected if the person suěers amnesia between t1 and t2? How does this
case diěer from the relationship between the mental states of the writing author and
the reading reader? Answering these and similar questions will lead us to a clearer
picture of the new sort of personhood we should welcome on four-dimensionalism.33
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